First in an occasional series.
The seventh and last of the propositional sentences that form the backbone of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 1921 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus states, “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” ("Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darueber muss man schweigen.")
Read literally, the statement forms a tautology. If one literally cannot speak of something, it follows by logical necessity, inherent in the condition of that first clause, that one is silent on it.
But Wittgenstein does not mean his statement literally. What he means is Whereof one cannot speak intelligibly, thereof one should be silent.
Wittgenstein’s aim is a directive against speaking nonsense, not a command that makes no sense.
That ambiguity, this overdetermination of meaning, is not incidental. It lies at the heart of Wittgenstein’s effort to consider the limits of language. What lies beyond those limits, with regard to its nature, not all necessarily agree. Many would say – I would — it is p…
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